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Abstract 
 
In 2000, the Rwandan government began the phased introduction of a decentralisation 
programme throughout the country.  The programme aimed at countering citizen’s 
exploitation and marginalisation - a principal driver of the 1994 genocide - through broad-
based participation in local development planning. This article analyses the extent to which 
Rwanda’s evolving decentralisation process is meeting this aim.  Tracking a shift in emphasis 
from local political participation to economic growth, it argues that increased 
technocratisation and centralised control combined with poor policy responsiveness and low 
levels of local government legitimacy are undermining post-conflict reconstruction.  
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Introduction 
Feted in Davos1, host to the World Economic Forum on Africa in May last year (2016)2, 
darling of both corporate consultants3 and world leaders alike4, Rwanda has emerged from 
the ashes of genocide to become the aid industry’s African posterchild.  The statistics are 
certainly impressive.  In the last ten-year period, the country has registered average growth 
rates of eight per cent per annum and has reduced inflation since 20095. It has received 
widespread praise for its economic governance reforms and low levels of corruption, making 
it an increasingly attractive location for inward investment6.  Through its rapid reforms at 
local levels in agriculture, infrastructural developments and social service provision, the 
government claims to have effected a spectacular reversal in poverty and inequality in recent 
years7 and interest is growing in Rwanda as a viable new form of African developmental 
state8.   
 
While concern has been expressed at the ruling regime’s suppression of political opposition9, 
its activities in Eastern Congo10 and, most recently, the decision by President Kagame to run 
for a third term in 201711, Rwanda’s meteoric rise as reflected through a range of 
development indicators is nonetheless significant and the country stands as a model for post-
conflict reconstruction and development for others within the Great Lakes region and 
beyond12. Decentralisation has played a large part in this remarkable story.  Launched on a 
phased basis in 2000, the ambitious programme aimed at countering citizen’s exploitation 
and marginalisation – a principal driver of the 1994 genocide – through broad-based 
participation in local development planning, building trust and cooperation across villages 
and enhancing local state-community relations throughout the country.  Taking a historical 
approach, this article examines the extent to which this evolving process is managing to 
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achieve this.  Tracking a shift in focus from local political participation to economic growth 
and development, research findings present evidence of increased technocratisation and 
centralised control over the process; a mismatch between community and local authority 
priorities; and low levels of local government legitimacy.  As parallels with the coercive, 
exploitative practices of the past emerge, and pressures and demands on local communities to 
invest physically and financially in development priorities not of their choosing increase, it is 
argued that the shift in focus and approach within the decentralisation process risks pushing 
communities too far, increasing their marginalisation, frustration and resentment, 
exacerbating local tensions, and undermining post-conflict reconstruction.   The findings 
presented here reinforce existing studies which point to centralised control of the process13 
and add to this literature by considering the implications of this for ongoing stability and 
post-conflict reconstruction in the country.   
 
The article draws on relevant policy and field research which was conducted by the author in 
Rwanda in February – April 2013 across six diverse rural sites in five different districts North 
and South of the country.  The broad aim of the research was to examine the role of 
decentralisation in post-conflict reconstruction.  Post-conflict reconstruction is understood 
here as a continuum of policies and programmes from the immediate post-conflict phase to 
the later broader phases of development.  Even where states have emerged from the 
immediate phase of post-conflict reconstruction, they require effective interventions that can 
contribute to security and development together.  And, as Beswick and Jackson note, ‘the key 
to managing this [process] is the creation of critical effective governance mechanisms in 
developing countries to provide where possible effective local ownership of 
development’14.The project forms part of a broader programme of research on 
decentralisation and post-conflict reconstruction in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the 
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Congo (DRC), and Rwanda respectively15.  Research sites, drawing on the National Institute 
for Statistical Research (NISR) district profiles, were selected to reflect both geographic and 
socio-economic diversity and include one of the wealthiest and one of the poorest districts in 
the country16.  Logistical assistance was provided by an international non-governmental 
organisation (NGO) which works on governance and human rights in Rwanda for 
transportation, personal introductions to local authorities, and the engagement of an 
independent translator (translating from Kinyarwanda to French where necessary) .  Due to 
the politically sensitive nature of academic research in Rwanda, the international NGO 
wishes to remain anonymous.  Semi-structured interviews with 99 randomly selected 
residents (every third woman and man encountered on transect walks through villages - 50 
female; 49 male) and 23 semi-structured interviews with local authorities (nine at district 
level; eight at sector level; and six at cell level selected by myself) were conducted in total 
across the six sites.  In addition, field research included a structured observation of an 
umuganda local planning session in Kigali, and semi-structured interviews with two national 
government officials; three NGOs; and eight international donor representatives.  The 
methodological challenges of conducting interviews in a divided society where history is 
highly contested and freedom of speech limited has been discussed in detail elsewhere17.  
Challenges include the nature of historical memory, selective telling, and difficulties 
assembling representative groups.  Moreover, my own positionality as a white, female 
researcher with links to an international NGO posed additional challenges, as did the 
positionality of both my NGO colleagues and translator.  I attempted to mitigate some of 
these by selecting the officials I wished to meet myself (although this was necessarily also 
determined by their own availability); daily debriefings with my translator to attempt to 
uncover and correct for any bias;  arriving unannounced to villages each day; conducting all 
interviews on a voluntary, one-to-one basis in private; emphasising at the outset that I did not 
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work for the government or any NGO; and assuring anonymity of all interviewees (no names 
were recorded – all interviewees were assigned a numerical code).  While issues of bias and 
selective telling remain inevitable, I hoped that these might be minimised through these 
measures. 
 
The article is structured as follows.  The following section provides a historical overview and 
reviews the rich body of literature on the complex range of factors underpinning the 
genocide.  Moving beyond simplistic accounts of ethnic antagonisms, it highlights in 
particular the psycho-sociological impacts of the acute political marginalisation and 
exploitation of vast swathes of the country’s population by its local and national political elite 
and international aid actors alike through the government’s decentralised structures and 
practices.  The link between post-conflict reconstruction and decentralisation in this context 
is discussed in the third section where a framework for the field research is set out.  Section 
four provides an overview of the aims and evolution of the decentralisation programme and 
policy.  It highlights in particular its shift in focus, in the mid-2000s, from local participation 
in decision-making and planning to economic growth.  Findings from the fieldwork are 
presented in Sections Five to Seven inclusive.  Following the framework set out in Section 
Three, findings are organised into sub-sections on inclusive governance, policy 
responsiveness and local government legitimacy respectively.  The article concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of the findings for the country’s ongoing stability. 
 
Rwanda’s genocide – the background 
The horrors of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its aftermath have been well documented.  
The brutal extermination of eight hundred thousand people over the space of one hundred 
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days has led to much interrogation and questioning – both of the international community’s 
lack of action in the face of such an egregious atrocity, and of the internal tensions and 
dynamics which underpinned it.  Specifically, scholars sought to understand what could have 
induced such a sharp and brutal level of violence among and between seemingly peaceful 
neighbours and villagers.  While we will never have a definitive answer to this question, a 
number of underlying factors and issues have been proposed.  These include historic patterns 
of ethnic inequality; the growing economic crisis at the time; the invasion by the Rwandan 
Patriotic Army18; international pressure for democratisation; and the widespread use of 
propaganda and hate speech in the lead up to and throughout the genocide19. 
 
While these analyses highlight many of the most salient immediate factors, a number of 
additional contributions provide insights into the more longstanding social dynamics 
underpinning the violence of the time20.  These variously argue that violence was an endemic, 
structural process in Rwanda pre-1994 characterised by longstanding dynamics of exclusion, 
marginalisation, inequality and frustration.  These dynamics, scholars argue, were promoted 
by national and local state and aid officials alike and they resulted in profound and deep-
seated social and psychological effects.  While such levels of prejudice and condescension 
are common in many African (and non-African) states and societies, what perhaps sets 
Rwanda apart is the combination of these with the omnipotence of the state and its intrusion 
into all aspects of social life at the time.  As others have cogently argued21, it was the strength 
and not the weakness or fragility of the Rwandan state that was central to the genocide.  And 
one of the principal vehicles for the institutionalised coercion, manipulation and exploitation 
of the local population was the country’s decentralisation process which, although designed 
to promote local-level, participatory development planning and project implementation at 
commune level, in reality served to promote centralised interests and plans22.    
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With each commune run by a Bourgmestre whose position resembled that of the local chiefs 
prior to the 1959 revolution, and with local civic associations closely aligned to the state, the 
entire decentralised structure operated in a tightly controlled top-down manner through a 
complex network of formal and informal committees and institutions.  A quote from a UN 
report in the early 1990s is illustrative of the degree of vertical authoritarianism of the era, 
‘Without prior consultation, authorities do not hesitate to communicate, during Sunday mass, 
the weekly calendar: reception of visitors, meetings of the sectoral or the cell sub-committee 
[local subdivisions of the single party], work in the coffee plantations, obligatory labour on 
roads, etc.’ 23.  A number of scholars highlight the role of these decentralised authorities in, 
not just in the routine coercion and exploitation of local communities through the extraction 
of physical labour and taxes in the official drive to meet ambitious development targets, but 
also in disseminating central orders and directing the genocidal violence and killing within 
their jurisdictions in 199424.   
 
Given the current popularity of Rwanda as a ‘donor darling’25, it is worth highlighting that 
Rwanda in this pre-genocide period was also widely perceived as a development success 
story.  As Peter Uvin notes26   ‘The image of Rwanda created by the development community 
was an idyllic one.  In brief, it was the image of a country of subsistence farmers faced with 
daunting economic and demographic challenges but endowed with a government that 
followed the right policies, the fruits of which the hardworking population enjoyed’.  Yet 
falling coffee prices coupled with growing land and income inequalities27 pointed to acute 
and rising inequality during this time.  Moreover women, who in the precolonial era exerted a 
degree of influence in their roles as mothers and food producers, were subjugated and 
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regarded as inferior to men28. Thus, according to a number of accounts of the period, while 
on the surface Rwanda appeared the model of a modern, developmental state, achieving 
impressive development targets and creating a modern infrastructure for local enterprise and 
development, this came at a price.  Scratching beneath the surface it appears that this 
impressive veneer masked a growing frustration and anger among the local population with 
the coercive and exploitative decentralised state apparatus, keen to meet ambitious 
development targets at seemingly any cost, exacting a significant physical and psychological 
toll on rural communities.  As we will see, while these costs were initially acknowledged by 
the new post-genocide regime when designing the current decentralisation programme, the 
transition in focus in the mid-2000s from local political participation to fast-track economic 
growth and development signals a regression to the authoritarian, coercive apparatus of the 
past.   
 
Post-conflict reconstruction and decentralisation 
Much of the early literature in the field of post-conflict reconstruction drew from a liberal 
framework which, aimed primarily at stabilisation, focused on political and economic 
liberalisation.  Within this framework, reconstruction efforts focused on national level 
initiatives such as the elaboration of elite, power-sharing agreements, the organisation of 
elections, and the promotion of economic growth through liberalised market-based 
economies29.  The relative failure of such liberal prescriptions in many countries however, 
has led to much questioning and critique, and more recent contributions highlight the need for 
more contextualised, country-specific understandings conflict.  Arguing that liberal 
frameworks only serve to reinforce the hegemonic status quo, leaving its inherent inequalities 
and selective privileges to a ruling elite intact, much of this more recent literature focuses in 
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particular on the local drivers of conflict, in particular the marginalisation and exploitation 
(real or perceived) of different groups and communities30.  
 
Focusing on these key drivers, which include poverty and inequality as well as political 
manipulation and exclusion31 and, in line with this local turn, post-conflict reconstruction 
initiatives which promote more inclusive access to resources and institutions, which devolve 
power and voice to more marginalised groups and communities, and which end 
discrimination against particular groups, including women, are promoted.  In this context, 
reconstruction efforts now often include longer term policies and programmes in the areas of 
local governance and decentralisation.  Recognising that national elites tend to revert to 
strategies that reproduce their positions of power, the aim behind local governance reforms 
and decentralisation programmes is to dilute these strategies, devolving power and authority 
to heretofore marginalised actors and communities32.  In this context, analysts argue that 
decentralisation can mitigate conflict at local levels by placing limits on the power of the 
centre through mechanisms of inclusive governance, thereby affording some degree of local 
autonomy.  This, the argument goes, enhances service delivery and government 
responsiveness to the needs and priorities of local communities which, in turn, increases state 
legitimacy and support at local levels33.   
 
This elite monopolisation of power and privilege referred to in the broader literature, strongly 
resonates with the socio-political climate in Rwanda pre-1994.  As we have seen in the 
previous section, this constituted one of the key drivers of the subsequent genocide.  In the 
following section we see that the country’s current decentralisation programme was 
developed with these drivers in mind and, on paper at least, with the ambition of reversing the 
marginalising and exploitative policies and practices of the past, thereby increasing local 
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government responsiveness.  Bearing in mind that the normative ideals of decentralisation do 
not always live up to its practice and experience34, the remainder of this article focuses on the 
degree to which Rwanda’s evolving process is doing so.  Drawing its framework from the 
relevant literature explored above, it explores the aims of the programme; local mechanisms 
for inclusive governance; policy responsiveness to local priorities; and community’s 
knowledge and use of local government structures.  
 
 
 
Decentralisation and reconstruction in Rwanda: Shifting priorities 
 
The normative potential of decentralisation for post-conflict reconstruction appeared to be 
recognised by the new Rwandan regime when it introduced its ambitious decentralisation 
programme in 2000 following a period of relative flux after the genocide.  The 2001 
Decentralisation Policy succinctly captures the inter-related problems of previous 
decentralised regimes including the inadequate participation of the population in decision-
making; inadequate financial resources at lower levels; lack of accountability and 
transparency in local management structures; a passivity and dependency among the 
population caused by excessive centralisation; and ‘an officialdom which erodes further the 
people’s say in the management of their affairs, the system being generally accountable to 
central government instead of being accountable to the people’35.  The resultant aim of the 
new decentralisation programme was thus to transform this system, affording citizens a voice 
in their own communities’ development.  ‘The overall objective of the decentralization policy 
is to ensure political, economic, social, managerial/administrative and technical 
empowerment of local populations to fight poverty by participating in planning and 
management of their development process’36.  The new programme therefore placed the 
substantive participation of Rwanda’s local communities at its very core.   
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The aim was to introduce this new form of decentralisation over a phased basis.  Phase I 
(2000-2005) introduced territorial reform.  Sous-prefectures were abolished and communes 
were replaced by districts which were further sub-divided into sectors and cells respectively.  
Phase I also introduced ubudehe – a local, participatory planning process involving social 
mapping, poverty categorisation and prioritisation of development activities and projects by 
communities themselves (see the following section).  The principal aim of decentralisation at 
this time was stated to be the promotion of reconciliation and social reconstruction across the 
country37.   
 
More sweeping territorial reform was introduced in Phase II (2006-2010).  In January 2006, 
the number of provinces was reduced from 11 to 4; of districts (from 106 to 30); of sectors 
(from 1,545 to 416) and of cells ( from 9,201 to 2,148)38.  Boundaries were redrawn and most 
localities and major towns took on new names, some of which were inspired by pre-colonial 
Rwanda39.  The administrative roles of these territorial entities were also redefined during this 
phase by removing the autonomy of provinces and transferring the principal coordinating and 
financial functions to the districts.  A new administrative structure, the umudugudu – village 
or agglomeration created through the government’s controversial villagisation policy40 (also 
known as umudugudu) – was also introduced during this phase.  Notably, this phase 
witnessed a concerted shift from political to administrative functions with a marked emphasis 
on increasing the administrative capacity of local authorities as the aim of decentralisation 
shifted from reconciliation to economic growth and development41.  A series of local 
elections was held throughout the country in 2006.   
 
13 | P a g e  
 
The third and current phase (2011-2016) aims “...to deepen and sustain grassroots-based 
democratic governance and promote equitable local development by enhancing citizen 
participation and strengthening the local government system, while maintaining effective 
functional and mutually accountable linkages between Central and Local Governments 
entities.”42. 
 
While the rhetoric of citizen participation continues to imbue the policy and programme, a 
significant shift has occurred in aim and emphasis.  This is perhaps most clearly reflected in 
the revised Decentralisation Policy.  This version, revised in 2013, reveals some fundamental 
changes in both the aim of the process and in the roles and responsibilities of its different 
actors.  Although the core concept of local participation in local decision-making is again 
reiterated within this, the broader tenor and content reflects a shift from the broader original 
goals of post-conflict reconstruction to more narrowly defined goals of economic growth and 
development, drawing on communities’ own resources for this.  This is reflected in the third 
objective which aims ‘to fast-track and sustain equitable local economic development as a 
basis for enhancing local fiscal autonomy, employment and poverty reduction, by 
empowering local communities and local governments to explore and utilize local potentials, 
prioritise and proactively engage in economic transformation activities at local, national and 
regional levels, and ensure fiscal discipline.’.43.  The revised policy also envisages a greater 
role for central authorities in local planning.  While the 2001 policy stressed the importance 
of decentralised, local planning – as set out in objectives (iii) ‘to develop planning, financing, 
management and control of service provision at the point where services are provided’ and 
(iv) “to develop planning at local levels’, the revised policy proves somewhat ambiguous in 
this regard.  While on the one hand, its first objective reiterates the commitment to 
substantive citizen participation in local planning – ‘To enhance and sustain citizens’ 
14 | P a g e  
 
participation in initiating, making, implementing, monitoring and evaluating decisions and 
plans that affect them by transferring power, authority and resources from central to local 
government and lower levels, and ensuring that all levels have adequate capacities and 
motivations to promote genuine participation.’44, its fourth objective introduces the concept 
of joint planning between central and local authorities with delivery and implementation 
alone left to local levels – ‘To enhance effectiveness and efficiency in the planning, 
monitoring, and delivery of services by promoting joint development planning between 
central and local governments and ensuring that service delivery responsibilities and 
corresponding public expenditure are undertaken at the lowest levels possible.’45.  Thus, 
overall, while retaining some commitment to local participation, the revised Decentralisation 
Policy reflects an increased emphasis on local economic growth, fiscal autonomy, and 
participation as cost-sharing via volunteerism, communal labour and increased local taxation.  
This means increasing physical and financial demands on communities which, in turn, further 
strain local relations and risk jeopardising any fragile social contract forged in the immediate 
post-conflict period. 
 
The government’s vision for the role of communities in local development is further reflected 
in the Community Development Policy, first developed in 2001 and revised in 2008.  In 
echoes of the pre-genocide discourse of the mobilisation of communities as engines of local 
development, participation is framed as participation in local development work rather than 
decision-making.  And so, ‘Local communities hold the key to sustainable development. They 
have the capacity to take charge of their own development and hence their effective 
participation is indispensible.  Participation should be mobilised and concentrated at the 
lowest operational - Umudugudu level.’.46.  Participation as cost-sharing rather than a more 
substantive, political form of participation appears to be what is in mind.  This is confirmed 
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as the policy progresses, with the reminder that ‘The Community Development Policy is 
based on the constitutional principles where the citizen has an obligation to use his labour to 
contribute to the prosperity of the country (Article 47 of the revised constitution of the 
Republic of Rwanda of 4th June 2003).’47.   
 
Taken together therefore, these somewhat subtle and at times ambiguous shifts in policy over 
time appear to suggest that, while the decentralisation programme initially purported to aim at 
breaking with the top-down, manipulative structures and practices of the past, by placing 
citizen participation in local planning and decision-making at its heart, as time has evolved, 
increasing centralist tendencies and growing pressures and demands on communities to meet 
ambitious development targets echo these manipulative structures and practices of the past.  
This is evidenced in an increased emphasis within the relevant policies on participation as 
communal labour (now enshrined within Article 47 of the revised Constitution) and increased 
local taxation aimed at achieving local fiscal autonomy.  In addition, a greater influence of 
central authorities in planning is apparent within the new climate of ‘fast-track’ economic 
development and there is a reduced emphasis on local planning and decision-making.   
 
While this is evident in policy, its manifestation in practice and, importantly, the implications 
of these developments for post-conflict construction and social and political stability in the 
country more broadly remain under-explored.  In particular, it remains to be seen if the 
increased demands on local communities are yielding outcomes which respond to their needs 
– i.e. if decentralisation, although now centrally devised and imposed, is responsive to local 
needs and priorities.  In addition, the quality of relations between local authorities and 
communities remains to be explored.  These aspects are the focus of the following section. 
 
16 | P a g e  
 
Shifting priorities and post-conflict reconstruction within communities 
The following subsections draw on fieldwork to explore the implications of these shifting 
government priorities for ongoing stability and reconstruction in the country.  Following the 
normative aspirations set out in the literature reviewed in Section Three, fieldwork explored 
levels of inclusivity and participation in local decision-making structures; programme and 
policy responsiveness to local priorities; and community knowledge of and engagement with 
local authorities and structures.  This latter aspect was explored as a proxy for local 
government legitimacy on the assumption that high levels of voluntary engagement with and 
knowledge of these structures would indicate a level of legitimacy.  The findings set out 
below demonstrate increased centralisation and control over local decision-making; a poor 
level of policy and programme responsiveness; and low levels of legitimacy for local 
government authorities and structures.   
 
Inclusive local governance mechanisms 
Two practices were developed to assure local participation in planning and decision-making 
in phase I of the programme - ubudehe and umuganda respectively.  Developments within 
these are outlined in turn below. 
Ubudehe 
Ubudehe, described by the Ministry of Local Government as ‘the traditional Rwandan 
practice and cultural value of working together to solve problems’48, was developed in the 
early 2000s as a local planning mechanism.  Involving a four step process (household 
classification (assigning households to wealth/poverty-based ubudehe categories); local 
resource mapping; problem prioritisation; and action planning, the process has been hailed as 
17 | P a g e  
 
genuinely participative and democratic49.  Today however, little remains of the original 
process.  Resource maps, once available for consultation in the offices of local authorities, are 
now archived in Kigali and deliberations on problem prioritisation and resolution are, for all 
interviewed for this research, a dim and distant memory.  Ubudehe now encompasses the first 
step only – household categorisation (on a 1-7 scale where 1 is the poorest and 7 the most 
affluent).  Final decisions on these categories now rest with local authorities.  Moreover, 
following the elaboration of a national database of statistics from ubudehe data in December 
2010, the government is now linking welfare payments and tax obligations to ubudehe 
categories.  Category 1 and 2 households receive some welfare payments through a donor 
funded scheme called VUP50 and their mandatory public health insurance payments are 
waived.   Category 3 households receive no welfare assistance and must pay an annual health 
insurance premium of RwFr 3,000 (approx. 3.62 USD) per household member, with this 
rising to RwFr 7,000 (approx.. 8.47 USD) for Category 4 households. 
 
The consequences of this technocratisation of ubudehe are two-fold.  First, with resource 
availability now the guiding factor in household categorisation, an ‘upgrading’ of households 
to Category 3 where they lose their VUP assistance and become liable for taxes is apparent.  
While the most common category among the 99 interviewees (42 per cent) was Category 2 in 
2012, 2013 saw a significant increase (up to 64 per cent) of households in Category 3.  
Overall, 31 per cent of interviewees’ households were moved up a category while just 2 per 
cent were moved down one following the linking of these categories to resources.  Second, 
there is evidence of considerable dissatisfaction with these new classifications.  Overall, 49 
per cent of interviewees expressed dissatisfaction with their classification.  Comparing across 
research sites, a correlation is apparent between levels of satisfaction and lower level 
categorisations.  For example in Site A in the North, where 70 per cent of interviewees are in 
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Categories 1 or 2, 80 per cent are satisfied with their categorisation.  Contrarily, in Site E in 
the South, where 73 per cent of interviewees are in Category 3, 82 per cent of interviewees 
expressed dissatisfaction with their categorisation.  While, given the small sample size, these 
figures in no way reflect overall ubudehe categorisations in the sites sampled or indeed 
nationally, the findings do suggest a growing dissatisfaction with the state’s increasing 
financial demands.  The regional variations (between North and South) in these findings may 
be politically significant given the historical socio-geographic division of the country.  It is 
interesting to note that the propensity for category ‘upgrading’ (and attendant liability for 
taxation) is lower in the North – the Hutu dominated region which, both in 1959-1963 and 
again in 1994 vigorously contested Tutsi control51.  Thus, this ubudehe manipulation may 
serve as a means to appease a historically oppositional North.  On the other hand, it may also 
simply reflect its higher levels of poverty and marginalisation.  As to ubudehe’s demise as a 
local planning mechanism, local officials and quite a number of civil society representatives 
argue that its spirit continues in the dialogue, discussions and planning sessions which take 
place at monthly umuganda meetings.  This is discussed below. 
 
Umuganda 
Umuganda refers to the tradition, prevalent in the Great Lakes region since the colonial era, 
of obligatory communal labour on public projects.  In Rwanda, umuganda labour works 
officially take place on the last Saturday of every month when, following the communal 
labour, meetings are held where community issues and plans are debated and agreed upon.  
This represents a significant difference to pre-genocide umuganda processes where no 
discussions took place.  The issues raised at these umuganda meetings, officials stress, feed 
upward to cell, sector, and district plans with, every five years, a formal upward-planning 
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process taking place for the development of the District Development Plan (DDP).  Yet none 
of the local officials interviewed were able to outline precisely how competing or contrasting 
demands are addressed or how local priorities are decided upon for these DPPs.  At district 
level, national (EDPRS) and international (MDG) frameworks were cited as important in 
setting development objectives, yet the link to local priorities remains opaque.  A 
representative from one of the donor agencies supporting decentralisation claims that the 
current 5-yearly district planning process, tellingly coordinated this time round by the 
Ministry of Finance rather than the Ministry of Local Government as is the norm, was 
conducted in considerable haste and constituted merely a desk-based exercise with no field 
visits or use of local plans of any sort52.  
 
Although the link between umuganda discussions and the district planning process appears 
weak or non-existent therefore, discussions do indeed take place following the completion of 
communal labour.  The form of communication acts (instructing, questioning, proposing, 
advocating, criticising etc.) and the discourses employed demonstrate the increasingly 
centralising tendencies of local governance.  A structured observation of an umuganda 
session in a residential neighbourhood in Kigali confirmed interviewees’ assertions that the 
main purpose of these meetings is to instruct residents on the latest centrally-driven 
development plans and their roles and responsibilities within these.  Taking place outside the 
local government authority’s office following several hours of communal work clearing 
ditches, seven local officials and approximately 300 community members attended.  Over its 
50 minutes’ duration, officials spoke for 40 with their contributions centring on the 
announcement of a series of new taxes (for refuse collection and school building 
maintenance) and fines and penalties (for failing to attend or to bring a hoe to monthly 
umuganda sessions).  The meeting also included interventions from 12 community members 
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(10 men, 2 women), with six of these insisting on the right to speak as the chair tried to bring 
proceedings to a close.  Nine of these community interventions were complaints about the 
new taxes, two related to a local theft and the final one was a proposal (rejected as it is not in 
the district plan) to use next month’s umuganda work to repair the local bridge.  Overall, the 
substance, tenor and tone of local authority contributions stifled rather than facilitated debate 
and revealed paternalistic attitudes and disciplinary intent as officials repeatedly stressed the 
responsibility of all to contribute, rebuking those who questioned local government plans.  As 
noted by a number of interviewees with whom this observation was discussed, it is likely that 
levels of both community dissent and officials’ tolerance levels for these are lower in rural 
areas.  However, as travel is prohibited on umuganda days, efforts to attend a session at one 
of the research sites were thwarted at the first road block.   
 
Taken together, the two principal practices of local participation in planning and decision-
making do indicate significant breaks from the past when citizens were afforded no space to 
express their views and opinions and dissent was not tolerated in any form.  Both ubudehe 
and umuganda represent new structures with the express purpose of providing a space for 
citizen voice.  However, the practice of employing these new spaces as spaces for 
‘sensitisation’ and instruction on top-down directives rather than as spaces for deliberation 
and shared decision-making sharply resonate with practices of  the past, and relations with 
local authorities – key to post conflict reconstruction – may be coming under increasing 
strain.  In the following two sections we examine these relations more closely, first through 
an examination of local authority responsiveness in addressing local priorities and needs; and 
second through an examination of communities’ use of and engagement with local authorities 
in both resolving local conflicts and in addressing problems with services.   
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Policy and programme responsiveness 
Proponents of decentralisation as an effective element of post-conflict reconstruction 
emphasise its role in increasing the effectiveness and responsiveness of policy and 
programming in addressing local priorities and needs.  In this section community priorities – 
explored with individual residents – are compared with those outlined by local officials 
where the latter form the basis of local policy and programming.   
 
As detailed in the previous section, the decentralised practices of ubudehe and umuganda, in 
theory, facilitate community participation in the identification of local priorities and issues.  
These, the theory goes, are then fed upward through cell, sector and district planning 
processes and form the basis of both the DDPs and prioritised activities at more local levels.  
Following this process, we could expect to see a high degree of congruence between 
priorities identified by residents and local authorities.  Across the six sites, residents were 
asked an open question of what constitute the most important issues for them in order to have 
peace and contentment in life.  A second question aimed at eliciting the same information 
inversely explored what the causes of absolute misery are.  Across the same sites, officials at 
district, sector and cell levels were asked to rank, in order of importance, the main priorities 
for communities within their jurisdictions.  The resultant coded and collated data is 
synopsised in Table 1 below.  Number one in each column indicates the collective top-ranked 
issue, number two the second, and so on.  While the findings for residents indicate a clear-cut 
collective ranking (seven issues, each with its individual ranking), officials’ (at cell, sector 
and district levels) collective rankings show an equal priority for some issues.  For example, 
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cell leaders collectively ranked domestic conflict and violence, food security and land 
consolidation, and cell office construction as equal priorities in fourth place.    
 
Table 1: Resident and authorities’ priorities compared 
  Priority Residents Cell leaders Sector leaders District leaders 
No domestic violence 1 4 3 - 
Food security / access to land 2 4 (consolidatn) 1 (consolidatn) 1 (consolidatn) 
Health services 3 1 (mutuelle) 2 (mutuelle) - 
Children in school 4 - 1 - 
Decent clothing 5 - - - 
To have an income 6 - - - 
Security / peace 7 - - 3 
     
Family planning - 2 - - 
Savings and credit facilities - 3 1 1 
Building a cell office - 4 - - 
Hygiene & sanitation -  3  
Roads - - - 1 
ICT and computer literacy - - - 2 
Electricity - - - 3 
 
 
For residents interviewed, the top three issues (in order of priority - domestic conflict and 
violence; food security and land access; and access to health services (denied for those who 
fail to pay their annual health premium)) reflect the multidimensionality of poverty and its 
effects on psychological as well as physical wellbeing.  For local officials, the top three 
issues (collection of annual health insurance premiums from all households; family planning 
(for population control); and the development of local savings and credit cooperatives) 
display an adherence to the national government’s priorities and programmes53.  Indeed, local 
officials note that a failure to meet 80 per cent of their targets (which, drawing from national 
priorities, include these three issues) means they lose their jobs, so clearly the pressures are 
immense.    
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Overall, while the findings do indicate some degree of congruency between community and 
local authority priorities (residents’ top three priorities of domestic conflict / violence, food 
security, and health are all reflected in the priorities of cell and sector leaders), significant 
differences exist in how these issues are framed, and thus, in the solutions proposed.  For 
example, while domestic conflicts arising from, inter alia, acute income poverty, stress and 
unequal power relations, constitute a key issue for residents, such conflicts are identified as a 
priority for local authorities only in so far as they impact negatively on centrally driven 
targets including agricultural productivity and primary educational enrolment rates54. 
Moreover, it is doubtful that the solutions proposed by officials – ‘regularisation’ of 
marriages55 and instructing couples not to fight – will address the complex relational issues 
underlying this problem.  Indeed, as other analysts have noted56, the technocratic and 
formulistic implementation of the country’s much heralded gender equality policies within 
the framework of a narrow economic rationale has minimal impact on local gender norms, 
practices and relations, particularly in the context of the state’s co-option of the once vibrant 
women’s movement.  Thus, while the findings indicate some level of congruence in priorities 
at cell and sector levels, the responses proposed are more aimed at meeting national growth 
targets than meeting local needs. 
 
Local government legitimacy 
On the assumption that levels of voluntary engagement with and knowledge of local 
government structures and authorities constitute an indication of a level of legitimacy, 
interviews with local residents sought to explore these factors.  Interviewees, asked to 
identify the principal role of village level authorities, cited (though with significant gender 
differences) three main roles.  Thirty-six per cent of interviewees (52 per cent male; 22 per 
cent female) cited their principle role as being to direct and instruct the population by 
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organising umuganda communal works, transferring orders from the top authorities, and 
reporting upwards to these.  Thirty-four per cent of interviewees (22 per cent male; 44 per 
cent female) cited their principal role as being local conflict resolution and solving local 
problems. A further 15 per cent (11 per cent male; 19 per cent female) cited both of these 
roles, while the remaining 15 per cent (equal male and female) cited local security as being 
their principal role.  Thus, the role of local authorities is perceived to be three-fold – to direct 
the community in carrying out orders from higher level authorities (principally male 
participants); to resolve local conflicts and disputes (principally female participants); and to 
assure local security (male and female participants). 
 
Asked about the role of district level authorities, 58 per cent of interviewees (48 per cent 
male; 66 per cent female) professed to not knowing at all.  Twenty-two per cent of 
interviewees (30 per cent male; 16 per cent female) suggested that they are there to ‘solve 
problems’ which are not solved at village or cell level; 10 per cent (7 per cent male; 13 per 
cent female) to carry out local development; 8.5 per cent (15 per cent male; 3 per cent 
female) to report to higher authorities; and 2 per cent (all female) for local security.   
Interviewees were also asked if they knew anything about their district budget.  97 per cent 
(equal male and female) responded that no, they have never heard of this, while 2 per cent 
(all male) claim to have heard it mentioned in meetings.  One per cent (all female) declined to 
respond.  These findings suggest a low level of knowledge of the role of district authorities – 
particularly among women, thereby suggesting a low level of legitimacy and trust.   
 
Although 58 per cent of interviewees were unsure of the role of district authorities, all 
interviewees had views on the role of their local, village level authorities as reflected above.  
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Interviewees were asked, given these roles, how often they have gone to their local 
authorities with an issue to be resolved.  Despite a relatively high level of knowledge of their 
role combined with their physical proximity, 58 per cent (63 per cent male; 53 per cent 
female) of interviewees have never approached their local authorities with an issue.  This 
percentage is particularly high in both Site A in the North (70 per cent) and in Site E in the 
South (73 per cent).  The gender difference in this overall finding is somewhat consistent 
with the finding reported above where more women than men see their role in local conflict 
resolution, while more men than women see their role as transferring orders from and 
reporting to higher level authorities.  Of those that have consulted their local authorities, 
seven per cent (all women) have sought assistance in resolving domestic disputes/violence; 
three per cent (all women) have gone to seek financial assistance as their family were 
starving; and two per cent (all women) have gone to report theft from their homes.  A further 
14 per cent (15 per cent male; 13 per cent female) have brought land dispute issues for 
resolution to local authorities; 10 per cent (15 per cent male; 6 per cent female) have gone to 
seek assistance in resolving disputes with neighbours while 7 per cent (7 per cent male; 6 per 
cent female) have gone to get official papers (to the Cell leader).   
 
It is noteworthy that local authorities are not associated with the provision of local services 
despite this being a stated aim of the decentralisation programme as well as, as we have seen 
in Section Three, an important component of post-conflict reconstruction programmes.  
Asked how problems with local services (water provision, healthcare, road erosion etc.) are 
addressed within local communities, 46 per cent of interviewees (48 per cent male; 44 per 
cent female) noted that they abandon the service or find an alternative, while a further 5 per 
cent (all women) said they did not know what to do when services broke down.  44 per cent 
(equal male and female) said that they go to the local village leader who organises an 
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umuganda to fix the service.  These findings illustrate that over half of all interviewees do not 
associate local authorities with service provision.  This is particularly prevalent in Site D 
where all interviewees reported that they abandon the service and in Site F where 87 per cent 
of interviewees abandon the service.   
 
These overall findings are somewhat mirrored in the findings in relation to how local 
conflicts are resolved.  64 per cent of interviewees overall (63 per cent male; 65 per cent 
female) attempt to resolve local disputes themselves, between families and/or neighbours 
without involving the local authorities.  32 per cent (30 per cent male; 34 per cent female) 
involve the village leader while a further 4 per cent (all male) consult another authority either 
from the church or from a local NGO.  Overall these findings indicate a relatively low level 
of active consultation with local authorities in relation to two of their identified core areas of 
work.  On the one hand this might indicate that, contrary to suggestions of a passive citizenry, 
local communities are well capable of resolving issues and getting on with their lives 
themselves and that strong and relatively effective systems of local dispute resolution are in 
place despite the damage caused by the genocide.  On the other, it may also be indicative of a 
strong distrust of and a low level of legitimacy for local authorities and institutions – 
something both Desrosier and Thomson and the IRDP also assert to be the case57.   
 
The findings also demonstrate strong continuities with the past, with citizens associating local 
authorities, more strongly than anything else, with organising umuganda communal labour 
and transferring the orders and directives from higher authorities downward to citizens.  This 
echoes local authority practices in the pre-1994 era, and stands in stark contrast to the more 
accountable, responsive one promoted within official rhetoric.  At district level, the findings 
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are unequivocal in pointing toward a very low level of awareness of the role and work of 
district level authorities and practically no awareness of budgetary priorities or plans.   
 
Overall, the findings reported in this section highlight relatively poor levels of political 
inclusion and policy responsiveness and are, in the main, strongly reflective of the more 
authoritarian and centralist form of leadership exerted in the pre-1994 era, together with a 
highly technocratic approach to development more broadly.  While undoubtedly effective in 
driving the country’s impressive macro-level growth and development, the strong historic 
resonances emanating from the research findings should perhaps give some pause for thought 
when considered in a historic context.   
 
Conclusion: Decentralisation reconfigured - What implications for 
Rwanda’s future stability? 
 
The aim of this research was to explore the evolving role of decentralisation in Rwanda’s 
post-conflict reconstruction.  Tracking changes in both policy and in local participatory 
mechanisms, the evidence presented has demonstrated a shift in focus over time, from local 
political participation to fast-track economic growth and development.  This has entailed 
increased centralisation and technocratisation of the process, together with increased 
demands on communities.  These findings support those of other researchers on various 
aspects of the process and highlight parallels with the past in relation to the pre-genocide 
regime’s policies and practices of decentralisation. 
 
28 | P a g e  
 
It could be argued that such developments are not, in and of themselves, a bad thing however.  
After all, there is no evidence of residents clamouring to be involved in local decision-
making and macro-level indicators, although plateauing, remain impressive.  Indeed, in many 
ways the Rwandan process is a good example of a “good enough” governance mechanism 
and feeds nicely into the current donor vogue for “what works in Africa”58.  However, when 
considered in the broader context of post-conflict reconstruction and stability, the additional 
evidence presented here is of immediate relevance.  Findings which demonstrate a mismatch 
between community and local authority priorities coupled with low levels of local 
government legitimacy suggest that the reality of decentralisation in contemporary Rwanda 
represents more a continuity than a break with the past.  And, as the findings on 
decentralisation from other jurisdictions demonstrate, this does not bode well for the 
country’s ongoing stability and reconstruction as a number of the key factors which support 
post-conflict reconstruction – notably a devolution in power; more inclusive local 
governance; enhanced local policy responsiveness; and increased local government 
legitimacy – are being increasingly undermined.   
 
At a time when post-conflict reconstruction success stories are hard to come by and political 
authorities and constituents in donor countries increasingly difficult to placate, Rwanda 
stands as a beacon of hope for Africa and the aid industry alike.  Against a backdrop of 
escalating violence and suffering in neighbouring Burundi and DRC, the images, messages 
and statistics promulgated by the Kigali regime prove tantalising and alluring.  Yet, like the 
many domestic conflicts which play out under the shiny tin roofs glinting in the sun in 
villages throughout the country, we should remember that shiny, modern veneers can mask 
deeper problems.  And we should remember that the international aid community has been 
blinded by such veneers before.  As parallels with the coercive, exploitative practices of the 
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past emerge, and pressures and demands on local communities to invest physically and 
financially in development priorities not of their choosing increase, the tentative social 
contract forged over twenty years ago may well be under threat.   The challenge now for 
adherents and proponents of decentralisation is to learn from and not replicate history.   
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1 See for example http://www.newtimes.co.rw/section/article/2015-01-21/185174/, accessed February 9th, 2016. 
2 http://www.weforum.org/events/world-economic-forum-on-africa-2016, accessed February 10th, 2016. 
3 See Crisafulli and Redmond, Rwanda Inc.: How a devastated nation became an economic model for the 
developing world. 
4 Kagame has been heralded as a ‘visionary leader’ by former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair.  In 2009, he was 
presented with the Clinton Global Citizen Award by former US President Bill Clinton and, that same year, both 
Time magazine and the Financial Times named him as one of the 50 most influential people of the new 
millennium.  Several scholars have also highlighted the remarkable achievements of the Kagame regime – see  
Golooba-Mutedi, “Collapse, war and reconstruction in Rwanda”, Ensign and Bertrand, Rwanda: History and 
Hope, Stansell, “The aftermath and after”, and Clark, The Gacaca Courts: Post-Genocide Justice and 
Reconciliation in Rwanda. 
5 See, for example, the IMF’s November 2015 Public Information Notice (PIN) 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15494.htm, accessed February 9th, 2016. 
6 World Bank, Doing Business 2013, 37–41. 
7 Government of Rwanda, Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2013–2018. Caution is 
advised in interpreting these statistics – see Ansoms et al, “Statistics versus livelihoods”. 
 
8 See, for example, Booth and Golooba-Mutedi, “Developmental Patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda” and 
Gaynor, “’A Nation in a Hurry’: The costs of local governance reforms in Rwanda”. 
9 Ansoms, “Rwanda’s post-genocide economic reconstruction”, Desrosiers and Thomson, “Rhetorical legacies 
of leadership”, Purdekova, “Even if I am not here, there are so many eyes: surveillance and state reach in 
Rwanda”, Reyntjens, “Rwanda, Ten Years On: From Genocide to Dictatorship”, and Straus, The Order of 
Genocide.  Other commentators highlight the high level of centralised control over the media, information and 
narratives on the Rwandan story more broadly (Beswick, “Managing dissent in a post-genocide environment: 
the challenge of political space in Rwanda”, Ingelaere, “Do we understand life after genocide?” and 
Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda). 
10 Prunier, From Genocide to Continental War, Reyntjens, The Great African War: The Congolese conflict and 
the crisis of contemporary Africa, and UNSC, Letter dated 18th May, 2012. 
11 See “US slates Rwanda’s Paul Kagame over decision to run for third term”, The Financial Times, January 3rd, 
2016 (available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6ec7a58a-b20f-11e5-8358-9a82b43f6b2f.html#axzz3ztNjVNLp, 
accessed February 9th, 2016) and “U.S., EU reject Kagame’s third term bid”, The Guardian, January 4th, 2016 
(available at http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2016/01/u-s-eu-reject-kagames-third-term-bid/, accessed 
February 9th, 2016). 
12 Study tours to Rwanda of local government officials from neighbouring Burundi and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo have been organised and sponsored by international donors (author interviews Burundi, September 
2011 and the DRC, January 2013).   
13 Much of the literature focuses on the lack of local participation in planning and decision-making.  Both the 
Rwandan IRDP, which talks of “ongoing centrist tendencies” (La Participation Citoyenne: Un des Enjeux de la 
Democratisation au Rwanda , 27) and the Ministry for Local Government itself (MINALOC, Revised 
Decentralisation Policy , 18) highlight the low levels of local participation in planning.  On specific aspects of 
the process, Hasselskog demonstrates how household performance targets are set by state actors (“Participation 
or what?”); Hasselskog and Schierenbeck show how local communal labour projects are determined by the state 
(“National policy in local practice: the case of Rwanda”)  while Sabates-Wheeler et al demonstrate centralised 
control over local poverty classifications (“Challenges of measuring graduation in Rwanda” ). Chemouni’s 
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tendencies at all three levels (“Explaining the design of the Rwandan decentralisation”). 
14 Beswick and Jackson, Conflict, Security and Development, 9. 
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“Challenges to decentralisation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: Beyond the political settlement”; 
Gaynor, “A Nation in a Hurry’: The costs of local governance reforms in Rwanda”; Gaynor, “Supporting 
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include ‘divisionism’, ‘negationism’ and ‘genocide ideology’ – see Waldorf, Instrumentalising Genocide).  This 
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of all foreign researchers and which proved extremely difficult to secure in this case.  
17 Burnet, Genocide Lives in Us; Holmes, Women and War in Rwanda; King, “From data problems to data 
points”. 
18 Led by Paul Kagame, the RPA invaded in 1990 leading to a civil war.  Once victorious, the RPA became 
known as the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and remains the ruling party to date. 
19 Des Forges, Leave None to tell the Story; Ensign and Bertrand, Rwanda: History and Hope; Pottier, Re-
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35 Republic of Rwanda, National Decentralisation Policy, 4. 
36 Republic of Rwanda, National Decentralisation Policy, 8. 
37 Interview state representative, 12/02/2013. 
38 Republic of Rwanda, Law No. 29/2005 of 31/12/2005. 
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50 The VUP programme funded by DfID targets low income households and provides cash transfers (direct and 
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51 Lemarchand, Burundi and Rwanda; Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide. 
52 Interview with representative of international development agency, Kigali, February 13th, 2013. 
53 See Government of Rwanda, Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 2013–2018. 
54 Interviews with Sector Executive Secretary, Site D, February 16th, 2013 and Sector Executive Secretary, Site 
F, February 24th, 2013. 
55 The principal function of the Sector Etat Civile officer is to ‘regularise’ or legalise common law marriages.  
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56 Burnet, “Gender Balance and the Meanings of Women in Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda”; 
Debusscher and Ansoms, “Gender Equality Policies in Rwanda”. 
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